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Abstract
This paper using China real estate listed companies 
from 2008 to 2015 as samples to analyze the relation 
among inventory digestion cycle, debt financing and 
product market competition and how these factors affect 
corporate value. The conclusions are as follows: (a) 
the inventory digestion cycle is significantly positively 
related to debt financing, and inventory digestion cycle 
takes on a inverted U-shaped relationship with product 
market competition based on debt financing; (b) high 
level or growth rate of inventory digestion cycle has an 
obvious inhibitory action on product market competition; 
(c) the higher the inventory digestion cycle, the smaller 
the corporate value, and the product market competition 
plays a partial intermediary effect between the inventory 
digestion cycle and the corporate value. The paper 
investigate the mechanism of inventory digestion cycle 
on the corporate value of static and dynamic perspectives, 
thus providing suggestive guidance for real estate 
companies to optimize resource allocation and improve 
management performance.
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INTRODUCTION
Adam Smith believed that competition is the mechanism 
for improving business efficiency, achieving the resource 
optimal allocation. As the core essential factor of market 
competition, product market competition not only 
embodies the market rules of the survival of the fittest, 
but also reflects the important indicator of the core 
competitiveness (Vickers, 1995). From the perspective 
of external development, product market competition not 
only reflects the connecting strength between enterprise 
products (services) and the market demand, but also is an 
important factor to measure company’s product market 
position and enterprise sustainable development ability 
(Song et al., 2009). From the perspective of internal 
governance, product market competition is an important 
evaluation index of management performance, which 
can effectively constraint the management behaviors 
and increase the crisis sense of management in order to 
reduce the cost of capital (Liao & Lin, 2016), speed up the 
product technology innovation and obtain a bigger market 
share and scale benefits (Gu, 2016). 
The  rea l  e s t a t e  indus t ry  has  h igher  cap i t a l 
concentration, larger opening degree and wider industrial 
chain coverage than other industries in China. By late 
2014, the IMF and other international institutions warned 
that a real estate oversupply problem had arisen that 
threatened to negatively impact the economy, particularly 
in 2nd and 3rd tier cities. According to IMF report, one of 
the biggest challenges to a recovery in China’s residential 
property market remains huge swaths of unsold homes, 
in Tier 1 cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen had created an inventory equal to less than 12 
months’ worth of sales. In Tier 2 cities, unsold inventories 
rose to nearly 1.5 years’ worth of sales. China’s least-
developed cities, those in Tier 3 and Tier 4, had an 
alarmingly high stock of unsold homes equal to nearly 
three years’ worth of sales. Russell Platt, the chief 
executive of Forum Partners said that China’s residential 
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property market is a major indicator of the country’s 
economic health, but the issue that really began to scare 
us is the extent of the inventory overhang. At the same 
time, James Chanos, the founder and president of Kynikos 
Associates said that when the housing demand isn’t there, 
the overdependence on new real estate will cause the 
nation to eventually “hit a wall”. With the overbuilding 
of real estate, the scale of debt financing has taken a 
quantum leap since 2010.  According to the 2014 Moody’s 
report, net debt levels for Chinese developers rose 29% 
from 2013, nearly twice as fast as their revenue growth. 
Debt pressure makes estate companies curtail borrowing 
for new projects and land purchases.
Product market competition is directly related to 
business operation and management benefits of estate 
companies. On the one hand, high-growth and high-
income lead to high debt and high leverage, “limited 
liability effect” of debt brings the enterprise scale 
economies, enhance the corporate value; on the other 
hand, high competition and high expectations produce 
high inventory and high risk, “plunder effect” of debt 
increases the bankruptcy risk of corporate. In particular, 
the companies which have the single product type, fast 
scale expansion, high internal transaction costs, higher 
inventory digestion cycle will face the danger of being 
eliminated. Therefore, the inventory has become an 
important problem in capital structure adjustment of real 
estate companies. According to the market competition 
theory, this paper analyzes the characteristic of inventory 
digestion cycle and debt financing of real estate listed 
companies in China and their relationship with product 
market competition, and researches the functional 
mechanism of leverage effect and scale effect from 
the perspective of internal governance and external 
constraints in order to provide useful reference for real 
estate enterprises to optimize the allocation of resources, 
enhance the competitive advantage and increase the 
company’s performance.
1 .  L I T E R A T U R E  R E V I E W  A N D 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
1.1 Financial Leverage and Product Market 
Competition
Debt financing is an important basis for affecting 
enterprise competitiveness, on the one hand, the increase 
in the cost of competition will reduce business net cash 
flow and influence the accumulation of internal funds in 
the fierce market competition (Yang & Wang, 2016). On 
the other hand, stakeholders will emasculate and restrict 
corporate finance capacity based on risk consideration 
(Maksimovic & Titman, 1991). Especially when there 
is no difference in products, services and management 
efficiency compared with competitors, the low financial 
leverage becomes a competitive advantage, business 
will choose a conservative financial policy based on the 
future operating expectations and market competition 
situation (Opler & Titman, 1994). There are different 
research conclusions between financial leverage and 
product market competition: (a) There is a positive 
correlation between financial leverage and product market 
competition. According to the “limited liability” affect 
of debt financing, the better the operating environment, 
the higher the marginal profit of the enterprise (Brander 
& Lewis, 1986). Therefore, the shareholders will raise 
the scale effect through the debt financing in order to 
obtain more surplus value. This aggressive behavior 
increases the competitive advantage of the firm in 
the product market (Lyandres, 2006). (b) There is a 
negative correlation between financial leverage and 
product market competition. Kanatas and Qi (2001) 
believe that in fierce market competition, high financial 
leverage enterprises will not only be affected by product 
demand and price, but also be restricted by the creditor’s 
principal-agent relationship, thereby these companies 
has steadily been losing market share to other firms 
which have low financial leverage. Especially in the 
change of macroeconomic environment, business cycle 
and industrial policy, the “predator effect” will be more 
significant, so the higher the financial leverage, the 
greater the finance and bankruptcy risk of firms. (c) There 
is a non linear relationship between financial leverage and 
product market competition. Based on complex market 
conditions, agency issues, asset exclusivity, bankruptcy 
risk, etc., debt financing of the listed real estate company 
takes on an inverted U-shaped relationship with product 
market competition, that is, with the increase of debt 
financing, the sensitivity of product market competition 
increase first and then decrease (Pandey & Chotigeat, 
2004). Therefore, debt financing is closely related to 
product market competition, based on the subjective 
and objective factors, the debt financing of real estate 
enterprise will not only affect the corporate performance, 
but also influence the investment decision. Based on the 
above analysis, hypothesis 1 is presented.
H1: There is a negative correlation between the debt 
financing and product market competition.
1.2 Inventory Management and Product Market 
Competition
The principal goal of inventory managing is always to 
strike a balance amongst the contending specifications for 
attaining ideal inventory ranges. Chikan (1996) argues 
that inventory is an important indicator for measuring the 
level of asset management and operational capacity of 
enterprises, but inventory strategy is a dynamic process 
that is influenced by the interaction between internal and 
external variables. Vastag and Whybark (2005) consider 
that inventory turnover has a knockout affect, it will 
indirectly affect the enterprise labor productivity and 
organizational performance based on indicators such as 
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return on investment, sales revenue and marginal cash 
flow. The relationship between inventory and product 
market competition includes: Firstly, there is a non-
linear relationship between inventory and product market 
competition. Jawahar and Mclaughlin (2001) find that 
enterprises will suit market competition and adjust the 
inventory strategy based on its life cycle. The results 
show that enterprise product inventory strategy is a non-
linear process. Secondly, there is a positive relationship 
between inventory and product market competition. 
Cannon (2008) argues that the inventory strategy is 
the external performance of the firm’s capital intensity. 
Capital-intensive business is often associated with higher 
inventory turnover, the value flow promotes the rapid 
development of the organization. Therefore, based on a 
given debt level, combinatorial optimization problems of 
inventory resources enhance the market competitiveness 
of enterprises. Lee et al. (2015) argue that although 
inventory management is constrained by liquidity and 
control, but the better the company innovation, the higher 
the efficiency of inventory management, and the stronger 
the product’s market competitiveness. Thirdly, there is 
a negative relationship between inventory and product 
market competition. As the market demand growth, 
companies may pursue short-term growth at the expense 
of “excess inventory” (Basu & Wang, 2011), but in the 
context of equity and debt financing, high inventories 
will affect corporate liquidity, increase financing risks 
and directly or indirectly affect business performance. 
Destocking has the narrow and broad definition: The 
narrow sense considers that destocking only refers to 
reduce the inventory level; the broad sense considers 
that destocking includes not only the reduction of the 
excessive investment and financing costs, but also the 
reform of stock control and product structure (Luciano 
& Peccati, 1999). Therefore, the competitive strategies 
of the real estate industry should not only consider the 
relationship between debt structure and risk tolerance, 
but also weigh up the relationship between the inventory 
strategies and the competitive behaviors of competitors. 
Based on the above analysis, hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 
3 are presented.
H2: The inventory digestion cycle is significantly 
negatively related to product market competition, and 
inventory digestion cycle takes on an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with product market competition based on 
debt financing.
H3: When inventory digestion cycle is higher 
level or faster growth, inventory digestion cycle has 
more significant inhibitory effect on product market 
competition.
1.3 Inventory Management, Product Market 
Competition and Corporate Value
Competition is not only a kind of management measure 
of “hidden incentive”, but also an effective external 
corporate governance mechanism, it can improve the 
efficiency of enterprise resource allocation and promote 
the survival of the fittest (Alimov, 2016). On the one 
hand, product market competition reflects the tightness of 
enterprise products and market demands, and promotes 
managers to increase productivity and reduce corporate 
bankruptcy risk (Nickell, 1996). On the other hand, based 
on the impact of internal and external factors, product 
market competition will aggravate agency conflicts, 
reduce resource utilization efficiency and profit margins, 
as a result, product market competition has a negative 
impact on ROA or ROE (Giroud & Muller, 2010). 
Market competition is one of the important factors in 
determining the corporate strategies. When the industry 
has a high market concentration, the company’s product 
market competition is positively related to the enterprise 
performance. However, if companies blindly pursue the 
market share, their operational risk will increase and 
enterprise value will decline. The optimal relationship 
between competition and inventory will directly and 
indirectly affect the firm value. From the positive point 
of view, a larger inventory is a strategic advantage for 
companies, which can not only improve the bargaining 
power of external financing (Tribo, 2007), but also correct 
the market price deviation by putting the product into 
the market (Blazenko, 1999). From the negative effect, 
inventory not only reflects the efficiency of the use of 
corporate capital, but also reflects the effectiveness of 
corporate oversight and decision-making, overstock is 
often a sign of poor management (Elsayed & Wahba, 
2013), therefore, high inventories will reduce corporate 
value. But due to the differences of production and 
operation conditions, industry, industrial policy and so 
on, the impact of inventory reduction on organizational 
performance is limited, zero inventory may not be an 
optimal strategy under special conditions (Deangelo & 
Roll, 2015). Therefore, the inventory management which 
is consistent with debt structure and competitive strategies 
enable to reduce operative costs and enhance corporate 
performances. Based on the above analysis, hypothesis 4 
and hypothesis 5 are presented.
H4: The product market competition is significantly 
positively related to the corporate value, but the inventory 
digestion cycle inversely related to the corporate value.
H5: The product market competition plays a partial 
intermediary effect between the inventory digestion cycle 
and the corporate value.
2 .  D A T A ,  D E F I N I T I O N S  A N D 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
2.1 Data and Sample Selection
Our study sample is composed of Chinese real estate 
listed firms during 2008-2015 from both the Shanghai 
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and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Financial statement data 
comes from the China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research database (CSMAR) and China national 
statistical yearbook. Data screening is according to the 
following standards: Firstly, excluding company samples 
which consecutive losses of two or more years; secondly, 
excluding company samples which data serious distortion 
and missing; thirdly, excluding company samples which 
inventory digestion cycle less than or equal to zero; 
fourthly, excluding company samples which under 
construction and new real estate value (area) are zero for 
2 consecutive years. There is over 816 data of 102 listed 
companies in our sample period. 
2.2 Variable Definitions
2.2.1 Product Market Competition
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is  the main 
international method for measuring the product market 
competition. The HHI variable, which is defined as the 
sum of the squared market shares of all firms in each 
industry. A firm’s market share (PMCi,t) is determined 
by the ratio of the firm’s sales to the sum of sales of all 
firms in the industry. According to the structure principle 
of the HHI, A firm’s market share (PMCi,t) generally 
includes absolute and relative market share. Absolute 
market share (APMCi,t) is the percentage of the firm 
i real estate sales (volume) that are held in the total 
industry sales (volume) in year t. Relative market share 
(RPMCi,t) is the percentage of the firm i real estate sales 
(volume) to the largest sales (volume) firm among the 
total industry or the sample in year t. In order to reflect 
the change of competition position of the small-scale 
company, based on the Rosenbluth distance method, this 
paper introduce the market share of each firm in year t 
as the weight (Wi,t) to determine the rank-based market 
share (SPMCi,t). SPMCi,t is determined by the ratio of 
the weighted salesi,t to the sum of salesi,t of n firms in 
real estate industry during year t. Here, salesi,t denote the 
total sales of firm i in real estate industry during year t, 
n is the number of firms in real estate industry, and Wi,t 
is the rank of sales of firm i in real estate industry during 
year t.
2.2.2 Debt Financing
The asset-liability ratio is the main measure of a 
firm’s capital structure or debt level, because the 
market perceives highly leveraged firms as risky, thus 
negatively affecting firm value. Following the literature, 
there are two alternative measures for leverage. First, 
book leverage is calculated as the book value of total 
debt divided by the book value of total assets. Second, 
market leverage is computed as the book value of total 
debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt and 
the market value of equity (Berger et al., 1997). These 
two measures are continuous variables that take values 
between 0 and 1.
2.2.3 Inventory Digestion Cycle
In the general companies, inventory is the raw materials, 
work-in-process products and finished goods that are 
considered to be the part of a business’s assets that are 
ready or will be ready for sale. However, the stocks in 
the inventory digestion cycle are residential building, 
business building and ancillary facilities of unsold, 
under or awaiting construction. The inventory digestion 
cycle is the logarithm of the ratio of unsold homes (area) 
of company i in year t divided by the average monthly 
turnover volume (area) over the past 12 months. In 
order to reflect the difference between the corporate 
inventory digestion cycle and the average inventory 
digestion cycle of the industry, the dummy variable 
of inventory level (ICDV i,t) is established. 1 if ICi,t 
of the company i in year t is greater than the national 
average inventory digestion cycle, and 0 otherwise. 
At the same time, the dummy variable of inventory 
growth (ICGDV i,t) is established to reflect the changes 
in the current inventory. 1 if inventory growth of 
the company i in year t is higher than year t-1, and 0 
otherwise.
2.2.4 Corporate Value
Corporate value is generally measured by ROA, ROE, 
Tobin Q and the ratio of EBIT to total assets. ROE is 
the core of DuPont Analysis, it is the percentage of net 
profit to average shareholder’s equity. Compared with 
the ROA, ROE is used to measure the corporate value 
based on the company’s actual profitability, it can truly 
reflect the investment return of corporate shareholders, 
in general, the higher the ROE, the greater the corporate 
value.
2.2.5 Control Variables
Based on relevant literatures, this study employed 
eight control variables. Firstly, a firm’s size (Sizei,t), 
measured by the log of total assets, is used as a control 
variable because large firms tend to enjoy economies 
of scale and thus may demonstrate better performance. 
Secondly, company listed age (Agei,t), measured by the 
log of listed years of the company i, is used as a control 
variable because the longer listed firms were capable 
of obtaining a bigger range of finance. Thirdly, with 
reference to the firm’s characteristics, we also include 
completion of sales (CSDV i,t), capital appreciation 
rate(Growthi,t), annual investment ratio (IRi,t), equity 
concentration (HT3i,t) and dividend (Divi,t). Finally, 
we controlled for CEO duality effects. CEO duality 
(CEODi,t) has been found to be an important antecedent 
of CEOs attitudes and behaviors, especially in regard to 
their risk-taking propensity. Among them, t-1 represents 
a lagged period, ε i,t represents random perturbation 
term that changes with the individual and time. Table 
1 reports the definitions of all variables used in the 
analysis.
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Table 1 
Summary of Explanation of Variables
Variables Abbreviation Definition
Corporate value ROE i,t The percentage of net profit to average shareholder’s equity.
Product market competition SPMCi,t The rank-based market share.
Inventory digestion cycle ICi,t
Log of the ratio of unsold homes (area) of company i in year t divided by the average 
monthly turnover volume (area) over the past 12 months.
Dummy variable of inventory level ICDV i,t
1 if ICi,t of the company i in year t is greater than the national average inventory 
digestion cycle, and 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable of inventory growth ICGDV i,t
1 if inventory growth of the company i in year t is higher than year t-1, and 0 
otherwise.
Debt financing Lev i,t
The book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets of the company 
i in year t.
 Company size Size i,t Log of the total asset of the company i in year t.
Company listed age Age i,t Log of listed years of the company i.
Dummy variable of completion of sales CSDV i,t
Completion of Sales (CS) is the difference between the actual sales and the planned 
sales of the company i in the year t divided by the planned sales,1 if CS≥1, and 0 
otherwise.
Equity concentration HT3i,t The square sum of the proportion of first three shareholders holding. 
Dividend Div i,t
Dividend is a dummy variable, 1 if the company i has paid cash dividends in the year 
t, and 0 otherwise
Capital appreciation rate Growth i,t
The net capital increase of the company i in year t divided by the total capital at the 
end of year t-1.
Annual investment ratio IR i,t
The total investment of the company i in year t divided by total assets at the end of 
the year.
CEO duality CEOD i,t
CEO duality is a dummy variable, 1 if the CEO also the chairperson of the board 
meeting and 0 or otherwise.
2.3 Models
2.3.1 Inventory Management, Financial Leverage and 
Product Market Competition
In order to reflect the impact of inventory digestion cycle 
and debt financing on product market competition, this 
paper introduces the inventory digestion cycle into the 
product market competition model (Qi et al., 2008) and 
obtains the following model:
SPMCi,t=a+b1Levi,t+βControls+εi,t (1)
SPMCi,t=a+b1ICi,t+βControls+εi,t (2)
SPMCi,t=a+b1ICi,t+b2Levi,t+b3ICi,t*Levi,t+βControls+εi,t                                                     (3)
SPMCi,t=a+b1ICi,t+b2Levi,t+b3ICi,t*Levi,t+b4(ICi,t)
2*Levi,t+βControls+εi,t                          (4)
SPMCi,t=a+b1ICi,t+b2Levi,t+b3ICi,t*Levi,t+b4ICi,t*Levi,t*ICDVi,t+βControls + εi,t                                                                                                  (5)
SPMCi,t=a+b1ICi,t+b2Levi,t+b3ICi,t*Levi,t+b4ICi,t*Levi,t*ICGDVi,t+βControls + εi,t                                                                            (6)
The regression (1) is used to validate H1. It used 
to explain the relationship between debt financing and 
product market competition. The regression (2), (3) and 
(4) are used to validate H2. By introducing the interaction 
between inventory digestion cycle and the debt financing, 
which are used to measure the common impact of debt 
financing and inventory digestion cycle on product market 
competition. Through the introduction of the second term 
of inventory digestion cycle to determine whether the 
existence of U-shaped curve relationship. The regression 
(5) and (6) are used to validate H3. By introducing the 
dummy variable ICDVi,t and ICGDVi,t, which are used to 
observe the static and dynamic effects of the inventory 
digestion cycle on product market competition.
2.3.2 Inventory Management, Product Market 
Competition and Corporate Value
In order to reflect the impact of inventory digestion cycle 
and product market competition on corporate value, this 
paper introduces the inventory digestion cycle into the 
product market competition and enterprise performance 
model (Song et al., 2009) and obtains the following 
model:
ROEi,t=α+b1ICi,t+βControls+φYear+εi,t (7)
ROEi,t=α+b1SPMCi,t+βControls+φYear+εi,t (8)
ROEi,t=α+b1ICi,t+b2 SPMCi,t+βControls+φYear+εi,t (9)
The Model (7) and (8) are used to verify H4, 
and analyze the impact of inventory digestion cycle 
and product market competition on corporate value, 
respectively. The Model (2), (7) and (9) are used to verify 
H5, and analyze whether the product market competition 
has an intermediary effect on the inventory digestion cycle 
and the corporate value.
3. RESEARCH RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 gives a descriptive statistic of the main variables. 
The mean value of SPMCi,t is 1.2136(%), indicating 
that the average market share of real estate company is 
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lower. The range of ICi,t is bigger, indicating that there 
are great differences of inventory digestion cycle between 
different companies, at the same time, the mean value 
of ICDVi,t is 64.71% and the mean value of ICGDVi,t is 
56.13%, indicating that high level and high growth rates 
of inventory are common. The mean value of Levi,t is 
62.86%, indicating that the real estate industry is a sector 
of high liability. The mean value of CSDVi,t is 75.74% 
and IRi,t is 56.60%, indicating that the current real estate 
industry sales and investment are in very good condition.
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std.dev Observations
ROE i,t 0.0965 0.0923 2.8542 -1.5596 0.1734 816
SPMCi,t 1.2136 1.2960 2.9957 0.0000 0.5851 816
ICi,t 1.6901 1.7704 9.0691 -4.7521 1.2816 816
ICDV i,t 0.6471 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4782 816
ICGDV i,t 0.5613 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4965 816
Lev i,t 0.6286 0.6567 1.7908 0.0145 0.1851 816
Size i,t 23.1267 23.0238 27.3366 19.8555 1.1864 816
Age i,t 2.6783 2.7726 3.2581 0.0000 0.4251 816
CSDV i,t 0.7574 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4289 816
HT3i,t 0.4803 0.4878 0.8336 0.1078 0.1638 816
Div i,t 0.6275 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4838 816
Growth i,t 0.4058 0.1003 37.2985 -13.232 2.1000 816
IR i,t 0.5660 0.4902 38.3722 0.0000 1.4555 816
CEOD i,t 0.8664 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.3404 816
3.2 Correlation Analysis
According to the Pearson correlation analysis, the 
correlation coefficient between ICi,t and SPMC i,t is 
-0.2306 (P<0.05), indicating that ICi,t inversely related 
to SPMCi,t,, and the correlation coefficient between Levi,t 
and SPMCi,t is -0.3332 (P<0.05), indicating that Levi,t 
inversely related to SPMCi,t. H1 has been concluded 
preliminary tests. The correlation coefficient between 
ICi,t and ROEi,t is -0.1165 (P<0.05), indicating that ICi,t 
is significantly negatively related to ROE i,t and the 
correlation coefficient between SPMCi,t and ROEi,t is 
0.2301 (P<0.05), indicating that SPMCi,t and ROEi,t 
appear in a obvious positive correlation. H4 has been 
concluded preliminary tests.
3.3 Hypothesis Tests
3.3.1 Inventory Management, Financial Leverage and 
Product Market Competition
In regression (1), the coefficient of Levi,t is negative, 
indicating that the debt financing is more restrictive to 
the real estate enterprises. The high debt financing not 
only increases the financial risk of the company, but also 
exacerbates the bankruptcy risk based on market “looting 
effect”. Therefore, the high debt financing plays a role 
of negative effects on product market competition. This 
result is consistent with Qi et al. (2008), Kanatas and Qi 
(2001) findings, so H1 was verified. In regression (2), 
the ICi,t and the SPMCi,t were negatively correlated, that 
is, inventory digestion cycle has an obvious inhibitory 
action on product market competition, indicating that the 
inventory costs shall be raised steeply based on inventory 
increase, so the product competitiveness will be decreased. 
The coefficient of the interaction between inventory 
digestion cycle and the debt financing is positive, that 
is, there is a significant substitution relation between the 
inventory digestion cycle and debt financing. In addition, 
the coefficient of (ICi,t)
2* Levi,t is negative, indicating that 
the inventory digestion cycle takes on a inverted U-shaped 
relationship with the debt financing and product market 
competition. In the context of high investment and high 
income in the real estate market, the leverage effect of 
debt financing has increased the scale benefit. However, 
the high inventory will reduce the financial elasticity, 
increase the financing risk and inhibit the real estate 
company’s market expansion and development, therefore, 
with the increase of the inventory digestion cycle, the 
sensitivity of the product market competition increase first 
and then decrease. H2 was verified. In regression (5) and 
regression (6), the coefficient of ICi,t*Levi,t is positive, the 
coefficients of ICi,t*Lev i,t*ICDVi,t and ICi,t*Lev i,t*ICGDVi,t 
are negative, indicating that if the inventory digestion 
cycle is higher level or faster growth, the competitiveness 
of real estate companies will be significantly weakened. 
H3 has been confirmed.
3.3.2 Inventory Management, Product Market 
Competition and Corporation Value
In regression (7), there is a negative correlation between 
the inventory digestion cycle and corporation value, 
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indicating that high inventory will increase operating 
costs and reduce business performance. In regression 
(8), there is a positive correlation between the product 
market competition and corporation value, indicating 
that product market competition is an effective external 
oversight method, which has played a stimulating role for 
management, thereby improving the efficiency of resource 
allocation and enhancing the company’s performance. 
This result is consistent with Nickell (1996) findings, 
so H4 was verified. According to regression (2), (7) 
and (9), the product market competition plays a partial 
intermediary effect between the inventory digestion 
cycle and the corporate value, so H5 was verified. This 
result show that the inventory digestion cycle direct and 
indirect impact on corporation value, therefore, inventory 
management and control is one of the most important 
works to enhance product market competitiveness and 
business performance.
Table 3 
Regression Analysis
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
SPMC i,t SPMC i,t SPMC i,t SPMC i,t SPMC i,t SPMC i,t ROE i,t ROE i,t ROE i,t
Lev i,t
-0.297** -0.524*** -0.490*** -0.554*** -0.552***
(0.144) (0.173) (0.171) (0.173) (0.172)
IC i,t
-0.075*** -0.155*** -0.154*** -0.117*** -0.126*** -0.013*** -0.010***
(0.013) (0.038) (0.037) (0.042) (0.039) (0.004) (0.004)
IC i,t* Lev i,t
0.143** 0.222*** 0.147** 0.156**
(0.064) (0.066) (0.064) (0.063)
(IC i,t)
2 *Lev i,t 
-0.024***
(0.006)
IC i,t* Lev i,t* ICDV i,t
-0.046**
(0.022)
IC i,t* Lev i,t* ICGDV i,t
-0.044***
(0.014)
SPMC i,t
0.036** 0.031***
(0.010) (0.011)
Size i,t
0.318*** 0.259*** 0.302*** 0.289*** 0.304*** 0.304*** 0.041*** 0.019*** 0.018***
(0.045) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006)
Age i,t
0.273 0.344* 0.297* 0.266 0.294* 0.286 0.037 0.009 0.009
(0.182) (0.178) (0.178) (0.176) (0.178) (0.177) (0.052) (0.018) (0.017)
CSDV i,t-1
0.312*** 0.278*** 0.281*** 0.275*** 0.279*** 0.328*** 0.025 0.009 0.004
(0.088) (0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
HT3 i,t
0.738*** 0.803*** 0.794*** 0.754*** 0.841*** 0.757*** 0.480*** 0.189*** 0.193***
(0.273) (0.266) (0.265) (0.262) (0.265) (0.263) (0.077) (0.037) (0.037)
Div i,t
0.056* 0.054* 0.050* 0.052* 0.050* 0.053* 0.005 0.004 0.004
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Growth i,t
-0.015*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.012*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IR i,t
0.003 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
CEOD i,t
0.023 0.034 0.040 0.054 0.051 0.052 0.024 0.007 0.006
(0.059) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014)
Cons
-7.709*** -6.551*** -7.138*** -6.758*** -7.184*** -7.190*** -1.287*** -0.583*** -0.533***
(1.127) (1.090) (1.104) (1.093) (1.101) (1.095) (0.315) (0.165) (0.164)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Adj R2 0.2144 0.2506 0.2623 0.2834 0.2679 0.2750 0.1925 0.1949 0.2053
Obs 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816
Note. N=816 for all models. Unstandardized coefficients are reported; the figures in parentheses are standard errors.
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01.
3.4 Robustness Tests
In this paper, the reliabilities of the research conclusions 
are tested by the following methods: Firstly, we replace the 
rank-based market share (SPMCi,t) with monopolize rent 
(Nickell, 1996) and replace book leverage with market 
leverage, plug into regression (1) - (6), the empirical 
analyses and test results support the hypothesis. Secondly, 
the non-parametric percentile Bootstrap method is used to 
test the intermediate effect of product market competition 
on the inventory digestion cycle and corporation value. 
The result satisfies a partial intermediary effect. Thirdly, 
in order to scientifically reflect the effect of the inventory 
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digestion cycle on market competition and corporate 
performance, we must take account of the economic cycle 
and national real estate policies influence. The data are 
divided into 2008-2011 and 2012-2015 two periods, there 
is no substantive change in the test results. In addition, 
due to the relationship between the inventory digestion 
cycle and product market competition or corporation 
value may has a certain endogenous, on the one hand, this 
article uses the method of ordered weighted to measure 
the product market competition, and uses the logarithmic 
method to measure the inventory digestion cycle, on the 
other hand, the article uses the robust variance matrix 
estimation method for further regression analysis, the 
test results can support the hypothesis. Therefore, the 
conclusions of this paper are robust.
CONCLUSION
This paper using China real estate listed companies in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen capital markets from 2008 to 
2015 as samples to analyze the relation of the inventory 
digestion cycle, debt financing and product market 
competition, and the direct and indirect effects of the 
inventory digestion cycle on corporate value. This paper 
expounds the relationship between leverage effect and 
inventory cost, scale effect and competitive strategy, 
which can help real estate companies to realize the 
optimal resources allocation and enhance the competitive 
advantage and corporate value. The results show that 
the inventory digestion cycle of real estate companies 
not only directly reduces the corporate value, but also 
indirectly affects the corporate value through the product 
market competition, and the higher the inventory level or 
growth, the greater the inhibitory effect on the corporate 
value.
The contradiction between high leverage and high 
inventory has become an important factor affecting the 
operating performance and competitive strategy of real 
estate companies. The high inventory not only reduces 
the production efficiency and economic benefits of real 
estate companies, but also improves the competition 
cost and bankruptcy risk. From the external financing 
constraints, the stakeholders of real estate companies 
will not only focus on corporate performance and 
sales growth, but also concerned about the company’s 
inventory costs and asset quality. When the market 
demand and industry policies change rapidly, the 
companies which rely on financial leverage to enhance 
product market competition will face stronger effect of 
double-edged sword. Thus, the inventory digestion cycle 
is the new benchmark of financial risk of real estate 
companies, so the stakeholders will take a conservative 
credit and loan strategy. From the internal corporate 
governance, the company’s management not only pursues 
leverage effectiveness and competitive advantage, but 
also worried about the backlog of inventory to further 
enlarge the plunder effect in the market competition. 
The balance of debt financing and inventory strategy 
is the first choice for enterprise development, and real 
estate companies which rely on external financing will 
pay more attention to keep earnings more stable and 
sustainable.
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